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This study examines the effect of family end control with a pyramid 
structure, RPTs disclosure, internal auditors and independent 
commissioners on related loan tunneling in Indonesia. This study 
used a sample of 258 public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2016-2018. This study provides empirical evidence 
that the final controller of the family with a pyramid structure is 
proven to practice tunneling through related loans. The next finding 
of this study is that the level of disclosure of related transactions can 
reduce the potential for the practice of tunneling related loans. 
Another important finding is the failure of the internal control 
mechanism by internal auditors and independent commissioners 
which is not able to reduce the potential for related loan tunneling 
practices in family companies in Indonesia. 
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Related lending is a lending activity between companies that have business line relationships 
within a business group. This transaction was carried out with the aim of meeting financing needs 
and improving the performance of the group of companies. Related loans are an efficient 
alternative source of internal funding for business groups to anticipate underdevelopment of 
capital markets in emerging countries (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Another benefit of related 
lending is the low asymmetry between companies conducting transactions, thereby minimizing the 
risk of default by the borrowing company. However, this transaction caught the attention of 
investors and regulators because of concerns that the parties involved in this transaction were 
misusing for their own interests and detrimental to the interests of other investors (Balyuk, 2014). 
 
Related transactions are generally carried out by the board of directors or controlling shareholders 
by using their authority to condition the transactions they do with their subsidiaries and transfer 
contracts with suppliers to other companies under control (Balyuk, 2014). In affiliated companies, 
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related transactions are carried out by the controlling shareholder using long-term contracts. Using 
this long-term contract, the controlling shareholder can reduce his business risk and can affect the 
performance of the affiliated company with the control rights he owns. This practice generally 
occurs in developing countries and countries with weak investor protection regulations regarding 
related party transactions (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). 
 
In Indonesia, the arrangements regarding related party transactions are specifically regulated in 
PSAK No. 7 (revised 2010) concerning disclosures of related party transactions. This Standard 
aims to ensure that the entity's financial statements contain the necessary disclosures about the 
possibility that the financial position and profit or loss have been affected by related party 
transactions, including commitments with those parties. IAI's attention to related party transactions 
within the scope of this accounting treatment is highly relevant, considering that the position of 
related entities can affect the profit or loss and financial position of other entities even if 
transactions with related parties do not occur. 
 
The ownership structure of public companies in Asia is different than in America and Europe. 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) found that the ownership structures of public companies in 
America and Europe were found to have scattered ownership, whereas in Asia, including 
Indonesia, they had a concentrated ownership structure. The consequence of the concentrated 
ownership structure is that there is a final controlling shareholder. The results of a survey by the 
World Bank (2010) that the majority of businesses in Indonesia are family-owned or controlled 
companies. This is consistent with the results of research conducted by Claessens et al. (2000) and 
Achmad (2008) which state that public companies in Indonesia are dominated by family 
businesses. 
 
The characteristics of public company ownership in Indonesia are generally in the form of family 
companies with a pyramid structure (La Porta et al., 1999). Through this structure, controlling 
shareholders can increase their control rights beyond their cash flow rights. This increased control 
allows controlling shareholders to be involved directly or indirectly in the management of the 
company. The positive impact of this increase in control is the reduction of type I agency conflicts 
between principals and agents, but it opens space for the creation of type II agency conflicts, 
namely between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders (Jansen and Mackling, 
1976). This type II agency problem arises when the controlling shareholder is involved in making 
management decisions that have the potential to harm the interests of the non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
One solution to reducing this agency conflict is to improve the internal control mechanism by 
optimizing the roles of the independent commissioner and internal auditor (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). It is hoped that the increased role of internal control will be able to suppress the 
opportunistic behavior of managers. Findings regarding the practice of tunneling have been widely 
disclosed in developing countries, generally influenced by several factors, such as poor corporate 
governance systems (Claessens, Djankov, and Klapper, 2010; Gao and Kling, 2008; Juliarto, 
2012), weak investor protection (Aharony, Wang and Yuan, 2010; La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2000), regulatory and business environment (Liu and Tian, 2012; Juliarto, 2012), and 
company ownership structure (Liu and Lu, 2007; Jiang and Wong, 2003). 
 
This study examines the effect of family end control with a pyramid structure, RPTs disclosure, 
Internal Auditor and Independent Commissioner on Correlated Loan Tunneling in Indonesia with 
control variables of company size and industrial sector. This study used a sample of 258 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018 with a purposive sampling 
technique. The findings of this study are expected to broaden investors' insights in the capital 
market and enrich empirical studies regarding the tunneling of RPT loans to family companies in 
Indonesia which are still rarely found. Another important aspect of the findings of this study is to 
provide input to regulators regarding the level of disclosure of related transactions, the 
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effectiveness of internal control mechanisms, particularly the role of independent commissioners 
and internal auditors, which are expected to improve the protection of non-controlling investors in 
the Indonesian capital market.  
 
The consequence of the concentrated ownership structure is that there is a final controlling 
shareholder. La Porta et al. (1999); Claessens et al. (2000); and Faccio and Lang (2002) classify 
controlling shareholders into five categories, namely: 1) family, 2) government, 3) financial 
institutions with broad ownership, 4) companies with broad ownership, and 5) other controlling 
shareholders. 
 
La Porta et al. (1999); Claessens et al. (2000); and Faccio and Lang (2002) identify family 
ownership based on the same last name and whether there is a marital relationship. Family 
members are categorized as one controlling shareholder with the assumption that they cast voting 
rights as a coalition (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). With a 10% separation of control rights, the family 
is the most dominant controlling shareholder (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002). 
 
The dominance of control by family controllers provides flexibility to exercise tighter corporate 
control, but this also has the potential to take over the company's assets from other shareholders 
(Faccio and Lang, 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Family controllers use a variety of means to 
transfer the company's wealth from free cash flow to another company where they have petty cash 
flow rights but with large control rights (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanez, and Shleifer, 2000). 
Controlling shareholders can transfer the company's assets to obtain private benefits through 
transactions between controlling shareholders and controlled companies (Gilson and Gordon, 
2003). 
 
Guo (2012) reveals that the presence of controlling shareholders with higher control rights than 
their cash flow rights causes a higher level of tunneling of related party transactions. Li (2010) 
examined tunneling performed by controlling shareholders in Chinese public companies, and 
found evidence of tunneling. Nugroho, Rahmawati, Bandi, and Probohudono (2020) state that 68% 
of public companies in Indonesia are family companies with a pyramid structure. Furthermore, 
Nugroho (2020) found that the final controller of the family with a pyramid structure was proven 
to perform tunneling through related party transactions. Based on some of the research findings, 
this research hypothesis can be formulated as follows: H1: The final controller of the family with a 
pyramid structure has a positive effect on the tunneling of RPT loans. 
 
Disclosure of RPTs is an activity to disclose transactions between related parties in accordance 
with the provisions contained in PSAK 7 (revised 2010). Disclosure of transactions between 
related parties is carried out with the aim of providing information to parties with an interest in the 
company's financial statements regarding the nature and types of transactions between related 
parties and their effects on the company's financial statements. The measurement of RPTs 
disclosure refers to the research of Juvita and Siregar (2015), which is to compare the value of 
disclosure made by the company with the total disclosure that the company should have made. 
Research on the disclosure of RPTs has been carried out (Utama and Utama, 2013; Hwang, Zhang, 
and Zhu (2010); Juvita and Siregar, 2015) with mixed results. Utama and Utama (2013) found that 
the RPT measure had a positive impact on firm value when transactions involved loans from 
related parties and had no impact on firm value. Hwang et al. (2010) found that the higher the 
disclosure of RPT would increase the transparency of the company's financial statements and 
reduce the tendency for abusive RPT to occur. Juvita and Siregar (2015) found that the disclosure 
of RPTs can reduce earnings management. Based on some of the results of these previous studies, 
the research hypothesis can be formulated as follows: H2: The level of RPTs disclosure has a 
negative effect on the tunneling of RPT loans. 
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Internal audit is an independent and objective assurance and consulting activity, designed to 
provide added value and improve the activities of an organization's operations (International 
Professional Practices Framework, 2011: 34). Internal auditors are formed by organizations to help 
achieve company goals, through a series of systematic approaches to evaluate and improve the 
effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes. 
 
The internal auditor is an independent work unit led by a Head of Internal Audit who is appointed 
and dismissed by the President Director with the approval of the Board of Commissioners. In 
carrying out its activities, Internal Audit adheres to the Internal Audit Charter established by the 
Board of Directors after obtaining approval from the Board of Commissioners. The Internal Audit 
Charter contains, among other things, the structure and position, responsibilities and authorities, 
code of ethics, and policies for the internal audit function. 
 
Tong, Mingzhu, and Feng (2014) conducted a study on BUMN in China that found that the quality 
of internal auditors plays an important role in controlling related transactions by controlling 
shareholders that have the potential to harm the interests of minority shareholders. Li, Sun, and 
Wang (2004) state that efficient internal control can, to some extent, prevent the company's 
controlling behavior from committing fraudulent actions as a result of agency problems, such as 
related transactions, manager's opportunistic behavior, and earnings management. The main 
function of the internal auditor is to ensure and assist management regarding the supervisory 
function, improve management effectiveness and implement governance within the company to 
increase value and improve company performance (Tong et al., 2014). Based on the research 
findings above, in this study the formulation of the hypothesis can be presented as follows: H3: 
Internal auditors have a negative effect on the tunneling of RPT loans. 
 
The management of companies in Indonesia adopts a two-tier board system, namely the separation 
of functions between the board of commissioners as an organ of the company that functions to 
supervise and the directors who are responsible for managing the company (UUPT No.40 of 
2007). An independent commissioner is a member of the board of commissioners who is not 
affiliated with the board of directors, other members of the board of commissioners and controlling 
shareholder, and is free from business or other relationships that may affect his independence in 
carrying out his supervisory function. Financial Services Authority Regulation No. 33 / POJK.04 / 
2014 states that the number of commissioners in the company consists of at least 2 commissioners 
and at least 30% of them are independent commissioners. Through the separation of functions and 
composition, it is hoped that the board of commissioners and independent commissioners can 
optimally perform their supervisory functions. 
 
Many empirical studies examining the role of independent commissioners on tunneling have been 
conducted with mixed results. Several studies have found that independent commissioners have a 
positive effect on earnings management (Liu and Lu, 2007), and asset appropriation (Gao and 
Kling, 2008) has a negative effect on expropriation (Shan, 2012) and financial fraud (Chen, Chen, 
and Chen, 2009). ), but found no effect on executive compensation (Chen et al., 2009) and firm 
performance (Shan, 2012). Empirical studies regarding tunneling activity have been carried out in 
various countries with mixed findings. Juliarto (2012) states that governance mechanisms in the 
form of foreign ownership and independent boards of commissioners in developing countries are 
not effective factors in controlling tunneling activities. Hastori, Sembel, and Maulana. (2015) also 
found that independent commissioners are not a significant factor in reducing expropriation 
practices. Based on some of the results of these previous studies, the research hypothesis can be 
formulated as follows: H4: The proportion of independent commissioners has a positive effect on 
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METHOD 
 
This study uses sample data on nine company sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, 
except for the banking sub-sector. The data was collected by using purposive sampling method. 
This study uses 258 sample companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018. 
Measurement of the dependent variable tunneling loan RPTs refers to Nugroho et al. (2020) which 
is measured by the difference between accounts receivable (short term and long term) and debt 
(short term and long term) divided by total assets. Short-term receivables used are other 
receivables except trade receivables, while long-term receivables used are related party 
receivables. Information on short-term debt used is other debt except trade payables, while long-
term debt is used for related party debt. The final control data for the family was obtained by 
Globe Asia (www.globeasia.com) which published data on 100 business groups in Indonesia in 
2018. Unique data on the ownership structure of the pyramid was traced from company financial 
reports, IPO reports and collaborative company websites to compile a sample company business 
group structure . Measurement of the level of disclosure of RPTs refers to the measurement used 
by Utama and Utama (2013) which compiled 10 questionnaires based on the six categories 
stipulated in POJK VIII.G.7 concerning Guidelines for the Presentation of Financial Statements, 
particularly on related party transactions. Data on internal auditors and independent commissioners 
were obtained from the company's annual report for 2016-2018. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Testing the hypothesis of this study using the binary logistic regression test to test 2 groups of 
tunneling and non-tunneling company classifications. The main regression model of this study is 
presented as follows: T_RPTsLi,t = α 0 + β1.ULTM_PYRMDi,t + β2.DSCLi,t + β3 .IAUDi,t + β4 
.INDEPi,t + β5 .SIZEi,t + β 7 .SECi,t + εi,t  
 
Where T_RPTsLt is the tunneling of RPTs loans. ULTM_PYRMD is the ultimate controller of the 
family via a pyramid ownership structure. DSCL is the disclosure of RPTs. IAUD is an internal 
auditor and INDEP is an independent commissioner. This study uses the SIZE control variable, 
namely company size and the SEC is the industrial sector. 
 
Table 1 Panel A presents descriptive statistics of all research samples (N = 258). The results of this 
test indicate that the dependent variable T_RPTsL has a positive mean value (14.17%) which 
indicates an indication of the tunneling behavior of the sample companies. The ULTM_PYRMD 
variable has a positive mean value (6.09%). This shows that the final controller of the family with 
a pyramid structure has an average control right that is higher than the right to cash flow by 6.09%. 
The DSCL variable has an average value of 62.57%. These findings indicate that the average 
sample company has a disclosure level of 62.57% of the supposed disclosure. The IAUD variable 
has an average value of 4.88. These results indicate that on average the sample companies have 
met the minimum requirements stipulated in POJK No. 56 / POJK.04 / 2015 that the minimum 
limit for a public company internal auditor is 1 auditor. The results of the INDEP variable test 
showed an average value of 42.67%. These results indicate that the average sample company has 
met POJK N0.33 / POJK.04 / 2014 that the minimum proportion of independent commissioners in 
public companies is 30% of the board of commissioners. The test results of the SIZE control 
variable showed an average value of 12.72. This value indicates that the average sample company 
has a large size, which is above 10.00. 
 
Table 1 Panel B presents the frequency distribution and independent sample t-test for the SEC 
variable, tunneling and non-tunneling company groups, as well as end-family and non-family 
controllers. The results of the industrial sector variable frequency distribution (SEC) test results 
show that of the 258 sample companies, 117 companies (45.30%) are included in the SDA and 
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Manufacturing companies category (1) and the remaining 141 companies (54.70%) are included in 
other company groups.  
 
In the test of the two categories of tunneling and non-tunneling companies, it shows that of the 258 
sample companies, 146 companies (56.60%) are included in the tunneling company category (1) 
and the remaining 112 companies (43.40%) are included in the non-company group. -tunneling 
(2). Based on the results of the t-test, the t-statistic value is 2.503 with a significance level of 0.013 
and a mean difference value of 29.58%. These results indicate a significant difference (0.013 
<0.05) between dummy 1 (tuneling) and dummy 0 (non-tunneling) in the tunneling activity of 
RPTs loans. 
 
In the test of two categories of family company groups and other than family companies, it shows 
that of the 258 sample companies, 186 companies (72.10%) are included in the family company 
category (1) and the remaining 72 companies (27.90%) are included in the company group other 
than family company (2). Based on the results of the t-test, the t-statistic value was obtained at 
8.265 with a significance level of 0.000 and a mean difference of 2.39%. These results indicate a 
very significant difference (0.000 <0.01) between dummy 1 (family firm) and dummy 0 (non-
family firm) in the category of company groups. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Independent Sample T-Test of all Observations (N = 258) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables 
 N Min Max Mean SD 
T_RPTsL (Y) 258 -0,55 11,99 0,1417 1,0821 
ULTM_PYRMD (X1) 258 0,00 0,71 0,0609 0,1413 
DSCL (X2) 258 0,22 0,89 0,6257 0,0683 
IAUD (X3) 258 1,00 6,00 4,8798 0,2244 
INDEP (X4) 258 0,00 1,00 0,4267 2,5816 
SIZE (X7) 258 9,2503 14,2534 12,7240 0,0379 
Panel B: Frequency Distribution and Independent Sample T-Test (N = 1,340) 
Industrial Sector (SEC) 
 SDA & Manufaktur (1) Others (0) Total 
SEC 117 141 258 
% 45,30 54,70 100  
Tunneling Related Loans (T_RPTsL) 
  Tunneling Firms (1) Non-Tunneling Firms (0) Total  
2 Group 146 112 258 
% 72,10 27,90  100 
T_RPTsL-1 (mean) 0,270142 -0,025719  
N 146 112 258 
t-statistic 2,503  
Mean difference 0,2958  
ρ-value 0,013  
Ultimate Owner (ULTM) 
  Family Firms (1) Non-Family Firms (0) Total  
ULTM  186 72 258 
% 72,10 27,90  100 
T_RPTsL-1 (mean) 0,127691 -0,177913  
N 186 72 258 
t-statistic 8,265  
Mean difference 0,0239  
ρ-value 0,000  
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Information: T_RPTsL= Tuneling Loan RPTs; ULTM_PYRMD= Final Control of the Family 
with a Pyramid Structure; DSCL= Disclosure RPTs; IAUD= Internal Auditor; INDEP= 
Independent Commissioner; SIZE= Company Size; SEC= Industrial Sector with Pyramid 
Structure; ULTM= Enterprise End Control. 
 
Table 2 below shows the Pearson correlation across samples (N = 258). The correlation between 
T_RPTsL and ULTM_PYRMD is positive and significant at the 1% level. The correlation 
between T_RPTsL and DSCL shows a negative correlation and is very significant at the 1% level. 
Different results were found in the T_RPTsL correlation test with the IAUD and INDEP which 
showed a positive and insignificant correlation. 
 
The results of the T_RPTsL correlation test and the control variable SIZE show a negative and 
very significant correlation at the 1% level, on the other hand, the SEC variable shows a negative 
but insignificant correlation. 
 






DSCL IAUD INDEP SIZE SEC 
T_RPTsL 1       
ULTM_PYRMD 0,264** 1      
DSCL -0,164** -0,068 1     
IAUD 0,000 -0,099 0.001 1    
INDEP 0,040 0,015 -0.057 -0,017 1   
SIZE -0,475** -0,138* -0.015 0,250** 0.181 1  
SEC -0,005 -0,063 0,211** -0.024 -0.025 -0.107 1 
Information: *; **;indicates significant < at the level 5%; and 1% (2-tailed). 
 
This analysis is used to determine predictors that differentiate between tunneling and non-
tunneling-indicated corporate behavior. Table 3 presents the results of the binary logistic 
regression test for 258 samples. The test results showed that the psudeo chi-square value was 
345.319 with a p-value of 0,000 and the psudeo negelkerke R square was 16.7%, while the 
accuracy of the logistic regression model was 67.4%. Table 3 presents a summary of the results of 
the binary logistic regression test. The results of testing the final control variable of the family 
through a pyramid structure (ULTM_PYRMD) show a positive and very significant regression 
coefficient at the 1% level. This result supports H1 which states a positive relationship between 
ULTM_PYRMD and T_RPTsL. The RPTs disclosure test (DSCL) shows a negative and very 
significant regression coefficient at the 1% level. This result supports H2 which states a negative 
relationship between DSCL and T_RPTsL. Insignificant results are shown in the testing of internal 
auditors (IAUD) and independent commissioners (INDEP) on related loan tunneling. These results 
cannot support Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4. 
 
The T_RPTsL test results with the SIZE control variable showed a positive and significant 
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Table 3: Binary Logistic Regression 2 Group of Companies: Tunneling dan Non-Tunneling 
(N= 258) 
 
Dependent Variabel: T_RPTsL-1 
Variables Exp. Sign  Coefficient p-value 
Constant  -3.281 0.165 
ULTM_PYRMD (H1) + 0.829 0.006*** 
DSCL (H2) - -3.609 0.000*** 
IAUD (H3) - 0.001 0.971 
INDEP (H4) - -1.426 0.178 
SIZE  0.457 0.014** 
SEC  0.049 0.862 
Notes: *; **; *** indicates significant < at the level.10%; 5%; and 1% (2-tailed). 
Chi-Square 34.319 
Significant 0.000 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 5.783 
Significant HL test 0.672 
Percentage Correct 67.4% 
Negelkerke R Square 16.7% 
Information: T_RPTsL= Tunneling Related Loans; ULTM_PYRMD= Final Control of the Family 
with a Pyramid Structure, DSCL= Disclosure RPTs; IAUD= Internal Auditor; INDEP= 





The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between family end controllers through a 
pyramid structure, RPTs disclosure, internal auditors and independent commissioners on the 
relationship between loan tunneling and the control variable firm size and the industrial sector. 
 
The results of hypothesis 1 testing indicate that the final control of the family through the 
ownership structure of the pyramid has a positive and very significant effect on related loan 
tunneling. This finding can be interpreted that related loans in business groups with a pyramid 
ownership structure tend to be used by the controlling shareholder of the family's end to carry out 
the practice of tunneling related loans which is detrimental to the interests of minority 
shareholders. This finding also confirms the type II agency theory that the separation of control 
rights and cash flow rights in concentrated ownership triggers agency conflicts between 
controlling shareholders versus minority shareholders. The dominance of control that is owned by 
controlling shareholders in business groups with a pyramid ownership structure can be freely used 
to control the company's management, either directly or indirectly. 
 
The results of hypothesis testing 2 show that the disclosure of RPTs has a negative and very 
significant effect on related loan tunneling. This finding can be explained that the higher the 
company makes related transaction disclosure, the more likely it is to reduce the possibility of 
tunneling related loan practices carried out by the end-of-family controller. Based on the results of 
statistical tests (Table 2), the average level of disclosure of RPTs for the sample companies of 
62.57% has met the minimum RPTs disclosure limit, which is 6 out of 10 disclosure items in 
accordance with PSAK 7 (revised 2010). These findings indicate that the higher the disclosure of 
RPT, the greater the transparency of the company's financial statements and reduce the tendency 
for abusive RPT to occur (Hwang et al., 2010). These findings at the same time confirm agency 
theory that through an effective supervisory mechanism, in this case, internal control by internal 
auditors can reduce the opportunistic behavior of company management which is controlled by the 
final controller of the family. 
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The results of hypothesis 3 testing indicate that the internal auditors have no effect on the 
tunneling of RPTs loans carried out by the end-of-family controllers. This finding can be 
interpreted even though the average number of internal auditors of the sample companies in this 
study shows an average of 4.8 which means that they have met the minimum requirements set out 
in POJK No. 56 / POJK.04 / 2015 that the minimum limit for internal auditors of public companies 
is 1 auditor, but the presence of internal auditors is not effective enough to control tunneling 
practices through RPTs loans which are carried out by the final controller of the family. These 
findings become interesting things in this study. Although in carrying out their duties the internal 
auditor has a clear mandate which is stated in detail and firmly in the Internal Audit Charter, but 
the strong control right of the family's final controller as the central power of decision making and 
management policy causes the function and role of the internal auditor to be ineffective and is 
limited to comply only with regulatory provisions. 
 
The results of hypothesis testing 4 found that the independent commissioners had no effect on the 
tunneling of RPTs loans carried out by the end-of-family controllers. This finding can be 
interpreted even though the average number of independent commissioners in the sample 
companies is 42.67%, which means that they have met the minimum proportion stipulated in 
fulfilling the OJK Regulation No. 33 / POJK.04 / 2014 amounted to 30% of the board of 
commissioners, but the existence of independent commissioners was not effective enough to 
control tunneling practices through RPTs loans that were carried out by the final controller of the 
family. These findings become interesting things in this study. Although the process of selecting 
independent commissioners in Indonesia is sufficiently well regulated in Law Number 40 of 2007 
as well as improved regulations through Bapepam Regulation Number IX.I.5 of 2011, in reality 
the existence of independent commissioners in family companies only meets formal requirements 
and does not. intended to streamline corporate governance practices. Meanwhile, the final 
controller of the family has a strong dominance of control so that the function and role of the 
independent commissioner becomes ineffective. 
 
The implications of this research are: First, the Government can encourage OJK as the regulator of 
the Indonesian capital market to make the various existing regulations more effective, especially 
those related to disclosure of related transactions. Through firm law enforcement, it is hoped that it 
can reduce various negative impacts related to related party transactions which are often used by 
the end-of-family controllers to carry out illegal transactions that have the potential to harm the 
interests of non-controlling shareholders. The implication of these two studies is that the 
government through related institutions can continue to encourage efforts to implement corporate 
governance practices in public companies in Indonesia. Through this improvement in the quality 
of corporate governance, it can strengthen and make the role of internal auditors and independent 
commissioners effective in carrying out their supervisory functions so as to reduce the occurrence 
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